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NOTES AND COMMENT
ENFORCEABILITY OF CONTRACT BY BANK TO PURCHASE STOCKS.

"Courts should be zealous to maintain the standards of safety
which have been demonstrated to be essential for the continued safety
of such institutions (banks). On the other hand, care should be
exercised not to cripple them and break down their usefulness by a
narrow and unreasonable construction of the statutes which will
result in unwisely limiting their usefulness in the transaction of
business under modern conditions." 1
The problem presented to the Court in the recent case of Block
v. The Pennsylvania Exchange Bank 2 demonstrates the practical
difficulties of applying this rule of construction. In that case the bank,
acting as the agent for an undisclosed principal, ordered from the
plaintiffs, brokers, certain stocks totalling $15,800. The plaintiffs
from time to time tendered delivery of the stocks so purchased to
the defendant, but the defendant in each instance requested the plaintiffs to withhold delivery thereof until on or about the 25th day of
June, 1928, when the defendant notified the plaintiff that it would
not accept delivery of said stocks or make payment therefor. The
plaintiffs sold the stock on the 25th of June, 1928 for $9,125, and
now claim a balance due them of the difference between the purchase
price of the stocks and the amount realized thereon, plus interest and
costs, a total of $10,375.
The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground
that it was ultra vires the power of a bank to enter into such transactions. This motion was denied.2a The Appellate Division reversed
the decision on the authority of their own opinion in the case of
Dyer et al. v. The Broadway Central Bank. 3 On appeal the question
presented to the Court for determination was whether or not such a
contract as that alleged in the complaint was ultra vires and illegal,
as contended by the respondent.
While an appeal on this case was pending, the Court of Appeals
reversed the Appellate Division in the Dyer case, and when the instant
case came up for review, it was reversed on the basis of their decision
in the Dyer case.
That we may determine whether or not this decision has either
legal precedent or economic necessity let us analyze our problem
from both angles.

II. Legal Aspects.
Section 106, subdivision 8, of the banking laws, gives banks the
power "when specially authorized by the Superintendent of Banks to
'Cardozo, Ch. J., writing in the Whiting v. Hudson Trust Company case,
234 N. Y. 394, 138 N. E. 33 (1923).
2253 N. Y. 227, 170 N. E. 900 (1930).
2a 134 Misc. 153, 235 N. Y. Supp. 671 (1929).
'225 App. Div. 366, 233 N. Y. Supp. 96 (1st Dept., 1929).
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act as trustee, executor, administrator, transfer agent, or registrar of
stocks and bonds, guardian of estates, assignee, or in any other fiduciary capacity in which trust companies are permitted to act. * * * "
Section 18 of the Stock Corporation Law expressly excludes
banks (as moneyed corporations under the General Corporation Law,
sec. 3, subd. 4) from its provision permitting stock corporations to
purchase stock of any other corporation. Section 10 of the General
Corporation Law provides that no corporation shall possess or exercise any corporate powers not given. These sections, when read
together, claims the defendant, make such an agreement as that stated
above ultra vires, illegal and void. The plaintiffs, on the other hand,
claim that the purchase and sale of stocks is an incidental power
necessary to carry on the business of banking.4
The defense of ultra znres has ever been frowned upon. The
attitude of the courts generally seems to be that where one has entered
into an obligation or contract he should be held to the consequences
of his act wherever possible. An examination of the cases where
banks have pleaded the defense of ultra vires demonstrates this
unmistakably. In Appleton v. The Citizens' National Bank 5 the
bank pleaded the defense of ultra vires where they had guaranteed
the note of a depositor to another bank, an act clearly with the prohibitions of the statute. The Court went so far as to say that even
assuming the contract to be ultra vires, since the defendant bank had
received an actual benefit from the contract, it must be compelled to
return whatever benefits it had received.
Similarly it has been held in New York that if a contract were
not immoral per se, but unlawful because the corporation is incapable
of making it, all benefits received under the ultra vires contract must
be returned.6
'Banking Law, sec. 106:
"General powers.-In addition to the powers conferred by the general and
stock corporation laws, every bank shall, subject to the restrictions and limitations contained in this article, have the following powers:
1. To exercise by its board of directors or duly authorized officers or
agents, subject to law, all such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry
on the business of banking; by discounting and negotiating promissory notes,
drafts, bills of exchange and other evidences of debt; by receiving deposits;
by buying and selling exchange, coin and bullion, and by lending money on real
or personal security. * * * "
190 N. Y. 417, 83 N. E. 470 (1907). aff'd 216 U. S. 196, 30 Sup.
Ct. 364 (1909). In his opinion in this case Cullen, J., said: "Yet the defendant, in our opinion, became plainly liable for the amount which it received
under the ultra vires contract. The law which obtains in this jurisdiction and

in several others is that where one party has received the full benefit of an
ultra vires contract, he cannot plead the invalidity of the contract to defeat
an action upon it by the other party."
'American Surety Co. v. The Philippine National Bank, 245 N. Y. 116, 156

N. E. 634 (1927). Judge Crane says in this case: "A contract being unlawful
and void, not because it is in itself immoral. but because the corporation by the
law of its creation is incapable of making it, the courts while refusing to main-
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Judge Lehman, in a dissenting opinion concurred in by Chief
Judge Cardozo, disagreed, not because the agreement was ultra vires
but because under the ultra
vires agreement, in his opinion, the bank
7
had received no benefit.
In the case of The Logan County National Bank v. Townsend, s
it was held that a bank cannot retain securities and at the same time
refuse to comply with the terms of an ultra vires agreement.
In the case of The Bath Gas Light Co. v. Claffey 9 Chief Judge
Andrews said:
"The courts in this state from an early date, commencing
as far back as the Utica Insurance cases, have sought to regulate and restrict the defense of ultra vires so as to make it
consistent with the obligations of justice."
The principal case differs from all these, in our opinion, in that
the defendant bank here received no benefit, either real or illusory,
from the transaction. And, with the single exception of the Dyer
case, which was decided almost simultaneously, we can find no authority for holding a bank or any other corporation liable on an ultra
vires contract where no benefit of any sort has been received. Since
the facts in the Dyer case are substantially the same as those in the
present case, we do not feel that it is necessary at this point to discuss
the former case.
III.

Economic Aspects.

Since we are at a loss for any legal precedent for this decision,
we turn to the economic factors that unquestionably influenced the
Court. As far back as Central National Bank v. White,'0 decided in
1893, the custom and propriety of banks purchasing stock through
brokers for undisclosed principals was recognized, with this very
important proviso: that the risk was on the customer, and not on the
bank. And the bank there was held liable not on the basis of any
contract, but because of its negligence.
In 1897 a decision of the Court of Appeals seemed to recognize
and sanction the practice of persons, residing outside of New York
City, and wishing to purchase or sell securities on the New York
tan any action upon the unlawful contract, have always striven to do justice
between the parties so far as could be done consistently with adherence to the
law, by permitting property or money parted with on the faith of the unlawful
contract to be recovered back or compensation to be made for it."
"'The benefit," said Judge Lehman, in his dissenting opinion, "must be
real, and not illusory."
' 139 U. S. 67. 11 Sup. Ct. 496 (1890).
0 151 N. Y. 24, 45 N. E. 390 (1896).
"0139 N. Y. 631, 34 N. E. 1065 (1894).
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Stock Exchange, going to their bankers and dealing through them."
But a closer examination of that case clearly shows that although the
defendants were called bankers, they were really stockbrokers, and
there is nothing in the case to show whether the defendants were
pfrivate bankers or whether they were under the supervision of the
State Banking Department.
More recently it has been said that we cannot assume that the
banking business of today is the same as it was a decade ago.' 2 The
raisond'etre of a commercial bank, says Holdsworth,' 3 is that "a bank
manufactures credit by accepting the business paper of its customers
as security in exchange for its own bank credit in the form of a
deposit account." Willis and Edwards 14 write similarly:
"The central function of a commercial bank is to substitute its own credit, which has general acceptance in the
business community, for the individual's credit, which has
only limited acceptability. * * * It does this by substituting
its own credit for that of the borrower or owner of wealth."
Now let us see what the writers say as to the actual entry of
banks into the brokerage field. Langston and Whitney 15 state:
"

* * * Banks are frequently called upon to make pur-

chases and sales of investment securities for their customers.
* * * While all banks, to a greater or lesser extent, make
investments in bonds and securities for their own account,
many of them also buy and sell securities for their customers.
Hence the banks are not only called upon for advice, but they
are frequently asked to make purchases and sales of invest'ment securities for their customers."
Fiske, in his book on The Modern Bank, says substantially the
same thing. 16
With these eminent economists as authority, we must agree with
Judge Hubbs, writing in the Dyer case, when he says: 17
"It is well known that many depositors in banks deal
directly with their banks in making purchases of stock on the
Stock Exchange. * * * "
"Le Marchant v. Moore, 150 N. Y. 209, 44 N. E. 770 (1896).
'Supra Note 6.
"Holdsworth, Money and Banking, p. 182.
Willis and Edwards, Banking and Business, p. 74.
Langston and Whitney, Banking Practice. p. 309.
iske, The Modern Bank, p. 154.
1" Supra Note
3.
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But we must disagree with the learned Judge when he proceeds to
dismiss the entire argument of ultra vires under section 106 by
merely saying:
"So far as we are advised, the Superintendent of Banks
in this state has never raised any objection to that extensive
practice."
Judge Hubbs, writing further, as his justification for paying no
attention to the foregoing argument, lays down the rule that
"in determining this case we should not close our minds to the
well-known fact that the banking business in this country has
developed rapidly during the last few years to meet the evergrowing demands of business. Banks ex necessitate have been
required to extend their functions and perform services forn erly foreign to the banking bushiess."
The principal case relies entirely on Judge Hubbs' opinion in
the Dyer case, and sets up as the test of whether or not a bank
involved in a transaction such as that alleged above should be
held to the terms of its agreement in spite of the fact that it is
ultra vires is:
"The test of power in all such cases is not the presence
of risk or its absence, unless it be so inordinate as to be a
speculative enterprise: the test is the relation of the act to the
substitution of credits, which is of the essence of the banking
function. Whatever risk is incident to the fulfillment of that
function, according to the practice of banking as it has developed in these days, is to be accepted and suffered as one of the
perils of the business." 18
We must respectfully submit that Chief Judge Cardozo's statements both in the Whiting case referred to above 19 and in the present case do not seem to us to have courageously faced the issue of
just how we are going to determine whether or not any transaction
is a speculative transaction. We cannot conceive of any venture for
which a bank may not now lend funds, other than out-and-out games
of chance. The social and economic undesirability of such a course
as the banks have been pursuing, and now will continue to pursue
with the approval of the courts, seems to us to be demonstrated most
sharply and convincingly during our present economic depression.
There is no question but that banks have pauperized business in order
" Supra Note 2 at 232, 170 N. E. at 901.
" Supra Note 1.
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to place their funds at higher interest rates on the Stock Exchange.
Now they carry their process of pauperization a step further, by
making money more easily available when their customers wish to
purchase speculative securities. The question will be asked: How
can the state prevent such transactions? Frankly, to us it seems possible only by legislation. And we claim that this legislation now exists.
We must adopt one of two attitudes: (a) Are we going to encourage
stock speculation, or (b) are we going to encourage legitimate business transactions? The court seems to have spoken. The restraint of
the statute has been ruled out, and now by judicial legislation a situation has been brought about which, in view particularly of the
present financial depression, is economically unsound.
We cannot close our eyes to the unique position which banks
occupy in society. That the Legislature never intended to allow banks
to deal with other people's moneys as they (the banks) saw fit has
hitherto been unquestioned.2 0 All the statutes dealing with the banks
and banking powers stand in formidable array as authority.
To us it seems that courts should be more wary of throwing
overboard the safeguards which sound conservative economics and
policies have placed on the statute books, in favor of the radical
practices of the school of "new economics" that flamed so brightly
during the hectic days of our "bull market." but are visible now,
if at all, by a subdued blush.
SIDNEY E. COHN.

LIABILITIES OF TRUSTEES FOR BONDHOLDERS IN EXCESS OF
THEIR EXPRESS UNDERTAKINGS.

The instrument which creates an express trust specifies the
powers of the trustee and in the main furnishes the measure of his2
obligations.' A trust deed or trust mortgage is such an instrument.
The trustee, with regard both to his powers and duties, is required to
act with the utmost good faith and diligence in protecting the interests
of both obligor and the bondholders. 3 He may not transcend the
' As an indication that conservative banks regard this practice with apprehension, see the circular published by the Central Hanover Bank & Trust
Company, New York, under the title, "No Securities For Sale."
'3 Pomeroy, Equity jurisprudence (3rd ed.), secs. 1062, 1079, 1080; 39 Cyc.
290-294; Ainsa v. Mercantile Trust Co., 174 Cal. 504, 163 Pac. Rep. 898 (1917).
See, however, Rhinelander v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 172 N. Y. 512, 65
N. E. 499 (1902), where the Court finds an implied duty arising from the
relationship alone.
' Browning v. Fidelity Trust Co., 250 Fed. 321 (C. C. A., 3rd. 1918).
' Davenport v. Vaughn, 193 N. C. 646, 137 S. E. 714 (1927); Goode v.
Comfort, 39 Mo. 313 (1866) ; Sherwood v. Saxton, 63 Mo. 79 (1876) ; Central
Trust Co. v. Owsley, 188 Ill. App. 505 (1914) ; Merchants Loan Co. v. Trust
Co., 250 Ill. 86, 95 N. E. 59 (1911).

